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REVISITING THE "ANONYMOUS SPEAKER PRIVILEGE"
Marian K. Riedy* and Kim Sperduto"
Over the past few years federal and many state courts have
generally adopted a new discovery privilege. This privilege
protects against the disclosure of the identity of a "John Doe"
defendant whose anonymous online speech has given rise to a
claim of defamation, copyright infringement, or other civil
wrongdoing. The privilege can be overcome, but only if the
plaintiff meets a higher evidentiary standard than is required by
the ordinary rules of pleading. That higher standard requires the
plaintiff to prove the existence of a prima facie case, at least, if not
more. In some instances, the plaintiff must submit to the court
sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment
before he can discover the identity of the alleged wrongdoer. This
Article argues that this discovery privilege, derived from the
principle that the First Amendment prohibits governments from
requiring identification as a precondition to speech, does not, in
fact, follow from that principle. But a discovery privilege against
the disclosure of the identity of a John Doe defendant does fit
squarely within the First Amendment's long-standing
"associational privilege." This Article discusses how the
associational privilege can and should be adapted to fit the online
world.
* Marian K. Riedy, Esq., has practiced as a litigator since graduating from
Harvard Law School in 1981; has an MBA from Georgetown University; and is
an assistant professor of business law in the School of Business, Emporia State
University.
. Kim Sperduto, Esq., is the managing director of The Sperduto Law Firm, a
complex commercial litigation boutique in Washington, D.C. He is a graduate
of Duke Law School, and also received his Masters in Public Policy from Duke.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery of
"nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense."' In most civil lawsuits, the identity of the defendant is
most certainly relevant, if for no other reason than to effect service
of process. Nonetheless, with increasing frequency, a plaintiff may
be barred from obtaining discovery of the identity of a "John Doe"
defendant-or at least confront a significant barrier to that
discovery-when the lawsuit arises from that John Doe's
"anonymous" speech.2 This barrier was erected by the creation of
a discovery privilege to protect anonymous online speech.
With few real exceptions,' the federal courts-and many state
courts-during the last decade have adopted special rules
governing the compelled disclosure of the identity of a John Doe
defendant in private civil lawsuits when that John Doe is alleged to
have committed some wrongdoing online, such as defamation,
infringement of intellectual property, stock manipulation, tortious
interference with contractual or prospective economic relations, or
fraud.' Specifically, the plaintiff must make some showing of the
evidentiary sufficiency of her claims above and beyond the
standard requirements of the rules of pleading.' Because online
'FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
2 See infra Part II.
3 See, e.g., Fagonnable USA Corp. v. Does 1-10, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.
Colo. 2011) (finding no basis in the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, or
the Rules of Civil Procedure for any new discovery privilege against the
disclosure of the identity of an anonymous online speaker, but nonetheless
assessing the merits of the plaintiffs claims against a higher standard than
would ordinarily be required by those Rules).
4 The identity of an online speaker may be sought for other reasons; for
example, because the speaker is believed to have evidence relevant to the case,
or to determine whether the speaker is or may have been acting as an agent or
employee of the named defendant at the time of the events at issue. However,
the discussion herein focuses on disclosing the identity of an anonymous
defendant.
5 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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speech is treated no differently from speech in the "real world,"6
these new rules also, presumably, apply to any anonymous John
Doe speaker. But because of the common-indeed, almost
universal-practice of using a pseudonym or fictitious name on the
Internet, this body of law has been developed almost exclusively in
cases arising from online speech.
These relatively new standards for obtaining discovery are the
product of a deceptively "straightforward equation" derived from
established Supreme Court precedent: The First Amendment
protects anonymous speech; online speech is to be accorded the
same degree of First Amendment protection as speech in other
media; and, therefore, anonymous speech online is entitled to some
degree of protection. That protection is provided by the
anonymous speaker's right to assert a "qualified privilege" to
remain anonymous.' A plaintiff seeking to expose the identity of
an anonymous online speaker can overcome the privilege because
"the right to speak anonymously is not absolute . . . ."9 However,
the assertion of the privilege demands a heightened showing by the
plaintiff of the validity of the claim that would not be required by
the ordinary rules of discovery.o
Despite the appealing simplicity of this First Amendment
calculus, this Article argues that one of the components of this
straightforward equation is inapposite. The courts are relying on
6 id.
See, e.g., In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that "it is now settled that 'an author's decision to remain
anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment'" (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S.
334, 343 (1995))); Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.
2010) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment provides protection for anonymous speech").
E.g., Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2009).
9 Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56014 at *9 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006).
10 Amy P. Nickerson, Comment, Coercive Discovery and the First
Amendment: Towards a Heightened Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 841, 846 (2010).
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the Talley v. California" line of cases, which struck down laws
requiring the disclosure of identity as a precondition to speech.
These cases do not, however, support the new discovery privilege
as it is currently deployed. 2 Imposing what is tantamount to a
summary judgment standard before the defendant can even be
identified errs in both reach and rationale.
This Article further proposes that another body of First
Amendment law-arising from NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson"-can and should be substituted for Talley and its
progeny in the equation. Unlike Talley, these cases bear directly
on the issue presented by the anonymous online defendants-
whether there is a First Amendment discovery privilege protecting
anonymous speech-and unambiguously hold that there is such a
privilege, and that it arises from the First Amendment right of
association. 4 This is the privilege that the anonymous online
speaker can assert.
But the contours of the "associational privilege" differ
markedly from the prevailing anonymous speaker privilege. In
order to align the anonymous speaker privilege with its true
provenance, the standards for asserting it must be substantially
revised. The burden should shift from the plaintiff back to the
defendant, who must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to
invoke the privilege with evidence that the disclosure of identity
" 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
12 Another scholar has reached the same conclusion, but for different reasons
than are proposed in this Article. See Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking "John
Doe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing Over Legal
Standards, 83 OR. L. REv. 795 (2004). Most of the scholarly articles do not
focus on the First Amendment underpinnings for the discovery privilege, but
instead propose variations on the standards for applying it. See, e.g., Nathaniel
Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE
L.J. 320 (2008); Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking "ANON12345 ": Applying An
Appropriate Standard When Private Citizens Seek the Identity of Anonymous
Internet Defamation Defendants, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 947 (2009); Lyrissa B.
Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1537 (2007).
" 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
14 Id. at 466.
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would have an adverse effect on the defendant's associational
rights.
The anonymous speaker privilege needs a substantial
redirection not only because of the shaky jurisprudential basis for
the privilege as it has been constructed, but also because the policy
considerations that originally justified the creation of the privilege
have been undermined by the realities of today's Internet. Early
advocates of the privilege extolled anonymous speech on the
grounds that "Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and
far ranging exchange of ideas."" It has been argued by many,
however, that unbounded anonymous online speech is particularly
dangerous, rather than worthy of special protection." Thus, for
example, "[o]nline, bigots can aggregate their efforts even when
they have insufficient numbers in any one location to form a
conventional hate group. They can disaggregate their offline
identities from their online presence, escaping social opprobrium
and legal liability for destructive acts."" This Article does not take
sides in this dispute, but it does presume that anonymous online
speech is not an unalloyed good to be protected at any cost.
Further, as discussed below, there are costs associated with
according anonymous speakers a discovery privilege. In Doe v.
Cahill," the Supreme Court of Delaware imposed a barrier to
discovery so high that it essentially mandates that the plaintiff
satisfy the summary judgment test just to have his day in court.
According to Cahill, "before a defamation plaintiff can obtain the
identity of an anonymous defendant through the compulsory
discovery process he must support his defamation claim with facts
1s Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
16 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 63 (2009).
17 Id.; see also Vogel, supra note 12, at 822 ("The general right to speak
anonymously on the Internet is substantially different from the asserted right to
remain anonymous when anonymity is being used as a shield protecting tortious
or illegal conduct. The rapidity with which false information, trade secrets, and
the like can be spread over the Internet creates a serious hazard, a hazard which
must be weighed in determining the proper judicial approach to these
situations.").
1 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005).
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sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion."" Federal courts
also apply the summary judgment standard in some
circumstances. 20 The result is that persons who have suffered real
injury from actual wrongdoing may be deprived of their day in
court because they cannot discover the identity of the wrongdoer21
based on a preliminary, "unregulated judicial 'gut check' " of the
merits of the plaintiffs claims.22
The anonymous speaker privilege, like other discovery
privileges, is "in derogation of the search for truth" and should
therefore not be "lightly created nor expansively construed." 23
Thus, the nature and extent of the anonymous speaker privilege
should be determined by the strength of the First Amendment
rights supporting the privilege. It is important, then, to ensure that
the First Amendment well supports the anonymous speaker
privilege.
If the instances in which defendants could assert the
anonymous speaker privilege were few and far between, this issue
would perhaps be of little concern. But because so much speech
today occurs over the Internet-e-mail, blogs, webinars, podcasts,
and the mammoth social networking sites-and so much of it is
anonymous, or at least pseudonymous, suits against John Doe
online speakers are more likely to proliferate than diminish.
Ensuring that the privilege against compelled disclosure is well-
grounded in precedent, and that the standards for protecting that
privilege are carefully crafted to balance all the rights at issue is,
therefore, imperative.
19 d.
20 Cf In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176-77 (9th Cir.
2011) ("Because Cahill involved political speech, that court's imposition of a
heightened standard is understandable.")
21 See generally Lewis, supra note 12.
22 See Vogel, supra note 12, at 809. As the author notes, the "gut check" is
usually "unregulated" because the trial court's decision to allow or disallow
discovery is not often subject to appellate review. See id. at 809-10.
23 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974), superseded by statute,
FED. R. Civ. P. 104(a), as recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987).
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This Article attempts to better map established, pre-Intemet
jurisprudence onto the world of the anonymous John Doe
defendant "speaking" online. Part II explores the evolution of the
anonymous speaker privilege in the district courts, focusing on its
theoretical foundation; describes the few circuit court decisions on
the privilege; and discusses the practical effects of the privilege on
the civil justice process. Part III analyzes the straightforward
equation from which the anonymous speaker privilege has been
derived and argues that the equation is faulty. Part IV explains
how the associational privilege encompasses a privilege against
disclosure of the identity of a John Doe defendant and explores
how the traditional privilege should be updated and revamped to
apply in the Internet world. As revisited and revised, the
anonymous speaker privilege would be better grounded in First
Amendment law, less of a departure from existing rules of
discovery, and more sensitive to providing aggrieved plaintiffs
their rightful day in court.
II. THE ANONYMOUS SPEAKER PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
A decade after it first appeared in a reported decision, the
anonymous speaker privilege has become a firmly embedded
discovery rule in the Federal courts. As would be expected for a
rule of discovery, the privilege was first articulated and developed
in the district courts.24 The privilege has also been generally
sanctioned by the circuit courts that have addressed it, but the
specific First Amendment precedent supporting the privilege was
not an issue for decision in any of these cases.25
The privilege is qualified and can be overcome.26 What the
party seeking disclosure must show to overcome the privilege has
been the subject of more debate than the existence of the privilege
itself. Pursuant to well-established First Amendment law, the
24 See Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
25 See, e.g., In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173.
26 See, e.g., id
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standard for overcoming the privilege depends on the nature of the
speech. 27 Anonymous commercial speech receives little, if any,
special protection. How the privilege can be overcome when the
anonymous is noncommercial is less certain. But whichever
standard is applied, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of meeting
"heightened" pleading requirements in order to unmask the John
Doe defendant.28
A. The Anonymous Speaker Privilege Develops in Federal
District Courts
One of the earliest cases in which a federal court considered
the issue of compelled disclosure of an anonymous online speaker,
and a case often cited for the proposition that First Amendment
rights are implicated, 29 is Columbia Insurance Co. v.
Seescandy.com.30 The plaintiff, licensee of various trademarks for
See's Candy Shops, Inc. ("See's") alleged, inter alia, that the
domain names "seescandy.com" and "seecandys.com" infringed its
trademarks and requested the issuance of a temporary restraining
order." The plaintiff had not, however, been able to identify the
person(s) who had registered the domain names, and the court
expressed its reluctance to enter an order that "could only be in
effect for a limited time and would be unlikely to have any effect
on defendant whom plaintiff has not yet located."32 Sua sponte, the
court considered whether it would be appropriate to allow the
plaintiff to proceed against a John Doe defendant and engage in
pre-service discovery to identify the putative defendant." The
court concluded that though this procedure was "disfavored," it
was within the district court's discretion to allow it, particularly in
27 Id. at 1177.
28 Id. at 1174.
29 See, e.g., Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573,
578 (N.D. Cal. 1999), inter alia, for the proposition that "[i]t is well-settled that
the First Amendment's protection extends to the Internet").
30 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
31 Id. at 575.
Id. at 577.
1 See id.
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order to determine whether the court had in personam
jurisdiction.34  The court in Seescandy.com buttressed its
conclusion with the following observations:
With the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain
tortious acts, such as defamation, copyright infringement, and
trademark infringement, entirely on-line. The tortfeasor can act
pseudonymously or anonymously and may give fictitious or incomplete
identifying information. Parties who have been injured by these acts
are likely to find themselves chasing the tortfeasor from Internet
Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually
discovering the identity of the tortfeasor.35
In such cases the traditional reluctance for permitting filings
against John Doe defendants or fictitious names and the traditional
enforcement of strict compliance with service requirements should be
tempered by the need to provide injured parties with an [sic] forum in
which they may seek redress for grievances. 36
But the court also acknowledged a countervailing consideration:
"the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums
anonymously or pseudonymously."3  The court did not
specifically derive this right from the First Amendment, but the
"open communication and robust debate"" that anonymity on the
Internet can foster harkens to First Amendment jurisprudence. To
fairly balance these considerations, the court required the plaintiff
to show the following before discovery could ensue: (1)
identification of the missing party with sufficient specificity that
the court could determine that the defendant was a real person or
entity who could be sued in federal court; (2) identification of all
previous steps taken to locate the defendant; and (3) that the suit
could withstand a motion to dismiss.39
The first explicit reference in a federal court decision to the
First Amendment rights of anonymous online speakers appeared in
3 Id. at 577-78.
3 Id. at 578 (footnote omitted).
36 Id.
3 Id.
38 id.
3 1 Id. at 578-79.
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2001 in Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.,40 a shareholder derivative class
action. The plaintiff subpoenaed an internet service provider
("ISP") to obtain the identity of several anonymous posters to an
Internet "bulletin board." 41 One anonymous poster moved to quash
on the grounds that compelling his "unmasking" would violate his
First Amendment rights.42 The movant was a third party witness,
and the rules of discovery generally give third parties greater
protection from the burdens of discovery than a party to the case.43
However, the court's analysis of the First Amendment implications
of compelling the disclosure of the identity of an anonymous
online speaker did not refer to the relationship of the speaker to the
lawsuit." Therefore, the 2TheMart.com analysis is a key
component of the evolution of the new privilege.45
In considering the validity of the First Amendment defense, the
court in 2TheMart.com relied on a straightforward equation,46 as
this Article describes the analysis. Thus, first: "A component of
the First Amendment is the right to speak with anonymity." 47 The
40 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001). Prior to this decision, as noted
by the court, a Virginia state court judge reached the conclusion that anonymous
online speakers were protected by the First Amendment. See In re Subpoena
Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 34 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
41 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. at
34. A "bulletin board"-more commonly referred to today as a message board
or chat room-is an online site devoted to a specific topic that is generally
determined by the administrator or creator of the board or chat room. See
Musetta Durkee, Note, The Truth Can Catch the Lie: The Flawed
Understanding of Online Speech in In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 811 (2011).
42 See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. at 34.
43 See 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. at 1095.
4 Id.
45 In contrast, the court adopted a higher standard for disclosure in
2TheMart.com than that in Seescandy.com because of the different relationship
of the online speaker to the lawsuit. See id.
46 ida
47 Id. at 1092.
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court cited Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,4 8
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,4 9 and Talley v.
California"o for this "well established" proposition.' Second, the
2TheMart.com court, citing Reno v. ACLU,5 2 asserted: "First
Amendment protections extend to speech via the Internet."" And,
finally: "The right to speak anonymously extends to speech via the
Internet."54
The 2TheMart.com court further noted that the degree of
protection afforded by the First Amendment would depend on the
type of speech at issue, or the height of the hurdle facing the party
seeking disclosure would vary, depending on the nature of the
speech." In accordance with established Supreme Court
precedent, "core" political speech should be afforded the highest
protection. 56 But the effort to obtain the identity of the poster of
non-core but protected speech at issue in the case-comments on a
company's financial performance-would only have to survive
"normal strict scrutiny."" The court held that "normal strict
scrutiny," at least for a non-party witness, would comprise
consideration of four factors: (1) the subpoena seeking the
48 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999) (invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, a
Colorado statute requiring initiative petition circulators to wear identification
badges).
49 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (overturning an Ohio law that prohibited the
distribution of campaign literature that did not contain the name and address of
the person issuing the literature).
o 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (invalidating a California statute prohibiting the
distribution of handbills not containing the name and address of the preparer).
' 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. The court cited NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), for the proposition that the
court's exercise of its subpoena power must be limited when it impacts First
Amendment rights, but did not further explore the role Patterson and its progeny
may play in the protection of anonymous speech. See 2TheMart.com, 140
F.Supp.2d at 1092.
52 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
5 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
54 d
5 See id. at 1093-95.
56 Id. at 1093.
5 Id.
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information was issued in good faith and not for any improper
purpose, (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or
defense, (3) the identifying information is directly and materially
relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) information sufficient to
establish or to disprove that claim or defense is unavailable from
any other source."
Two years later a similar issue was addressed by the court in In
re Verizon Internet Services, Inc." In this District of Columbia
case, Verizon moved to quash a subpoena served by the Recording
Industry Association of America pursuant to section 512(h) of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act."0 The subpoena sought the
identity of anonymous users of Verizon's Internet services who
had allegedly infringed copyrights by downloading songs over the
Internet." Verizon objected to complying with the subpoena on
the grounds, inter alia, that section 512(h) violated the First
Amendment rights of Internet users.62 In addressing this objection,
based on the very same precedent cited in 2TheMart.com,6 the
court in Verizon reached the same conclusion: Anonymous online
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection.' The court also
concluded, however, that because the "speech" at issue allegedly
constituted copyright infringement, which is not protected by the
First Amendment, the anonymous expression of that speech would
be accorded "minimal" protection,6 5 which was satisfied by the
s1d. at 1095.
257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2004).
o 1d. at 246; 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006).
61 257 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
62 See id.
63 Id. at 259. The court referenced Patterson in similar fashion as did the
court in 2TheMart.com. That is, in a footnote, the court noted precedent for
"some limitations on the subpoena power when its invocation affects First
Amendment rights involving anonymity." Id. at 259 n.17 (citing NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958)). But the court did not
explore the right to anonymity set forth in that Supreme Court case. This
exploration will be undertaken in Part III.
6 See In re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
5 Id. at 260.
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procedural requirements of section 512(h). In particular, the court
noted, "in order to obtain a subpoena [pursuant to the statute], the
copyright owner must, in effect, plead a prima facie case of
copyright infringement."6 6
Shortly after Verizon, a similar case was decided in the
Southern District of New York. In Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.
v. Does 1-40,67 the plaintiffs subpoenaed an ISP seeking the
identity of anonymous users who had allegedly infringed
copyrighted material using "peer-to-peer" file sharing.68 The ISP
objected on, inter alia, First Amendment grounds. As in Verizon,
the court reasoned that the First Amendment protects anonymous
speech, including anonymous speech on the Internet. 69 The court
also agreed with Verizon that the John Does' First Amendment
rights were entitled to only "limited" protection, but for a different
reason: Downloading and sharing computer files is arguably
"expressive," but not the type of "true expression" or "political
expression" that would be subject to full protection."o In order to
give that limited protection to the file sharers, the court considered
five factors in deciding whether the identity of the John Doe
defendants should be disclosed: (1) the plaintiffs ability to
establish a prima facie claim, (2) the specificity of plaintiffs
discovery request, (3) the availability of alternative means to
obtain the subpoenaed information, (4) the central need for
discovery to advance plaintiffs claim, and (5) defendants'
expectation of privacy."
After Sony, the federal district courts almost unanimously
viewed a subpoena to disclose the identity of an anonymous online
speaker as implicating the speaker's First Amendment rights.72 For
66 Id. at 263.
67 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 562.
70 Id. at 564.
71 Id. at 564-67.
72 A faint dissent was voiced in Faconnable USA Corp. v. John Does 1-10,
799 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (D. Colo. 2011).
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example, in Highfields Capital Management v. Doe," in which the
plaintiff sought to disclose the identity of the owner of an Internet
screen name who had allegedly infringed the plaintiffs trademark,
the District Court for the Northern District of California, citing
Seescandy. com,74 stated: "What defendant seeks to protect through
his motion to quash is the right to express most effectively and
anonymously, without fear of expensive adverse consequences, his
views about matters in which many other members of the public
are interested."" Similarly, in Best Western International, Inc. v.
Doe,76 the plaintiff sought to disclose the identity of online posters
of statements that allegedly disclosed confidential information,
were defamatory, and in breach of fiduciary duty. The District
Court for the District of Arizona began its analysis of the objection
to that disclosure on the premise that anonymous online speech
was entitled to First Amendment protection,7 as did the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Raw Films, Ltd. v.
John Does 1-15."
" 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
74 The court also cited Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001). In developing standards for protecting the new discovery
privilege, the federal courts relied on several state court cases, including not
only Dendrite but also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52
Va. Cir. 26, 34 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), and John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,
457 (Del. 2005). But both the federal and state courts employed the same
rationale for creating these standards-the First Amendment protects
anonymous online speech-and relied on the same Supreme Court precedent for
formulating that rationale. See, e.g., Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 765. Because it is
this underlying equation that is the focus here, the state court decisions are here
noted, but not specifically analyzed.
7 Highfields, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75.
76 No. 06-1537, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jul. 25, 2006).
n Id. at *7-8.
78 No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27,
2012). See also Doe I, & Doe II v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 253-54
(D.C. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that in ruling on a motion to quash, "Doe 21 has a
First Amendment right to anonymous Internet speech"); Fodor v. John Doe,
3:10-CV-0798-RCJ(VPC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49672, at *7-8 (D. Nev. Apr.
27, 2011) ("The court must weigh the rights of the harmed party to expose an
anonymous online speaker against the anonymous speaker's First Amendment
right of free speech."); In re Rule 45 Subpoena, No. MISC 08-
262 [VOL. 14: 249
Anonymous Speaker Privilege
What the party seeking disclosure must show to overcome the
privilege has been the subject of more debate than the existence of
the privilege itself. While the issue was relatively novel, and
precedent slight, courts developed differing standards for balancing
discovery rights and First Amendment rights.79 Now, however, a
consensus is beginning to emerge." Many of the district courts
that have addressed the anonymous speaker privilege when it has
been asserted to protect noncommercial speech apply the standard
devised by the court in Sony"' or the comparable test developed by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dendrite International, Inc. v.
Doe.82 The key requirement of each approach is a showing of a
prima facie case and a "heightened" need for the information
sought.83 When the speech at issue is "purely expressive,"8 which
347(ARR)(MDG), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40653, at *22-23 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
2010) (recommending that motion to quash be granted because the anonymous
online speech at issue "is purely expressive and thus entitled to heightened First
Amendment protection"); Salehoo Grp. v. ABC Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1214 (W.D. Wash. 2010) ("Subpoenas seeking the identity of anonymous
individuals raise First Amendment concerns.").
7 See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2011)
(describing the many and sometimes conflicting standards).
80 See, e.g., Salehoo, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1214 ("The case law, though still in
development, has begun to coalesce around the basic framework of the test
articulated in Dendrite Int'l, Inc .... ); accord, Koch Indus. v. Does 1-25, No.
2:10CV1275DAK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49529, at *26 (D. Utah May 9,
2011).
81 Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
82 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
83 See id. at 760. The Dendrite test also requires that the anonymous
defendant be given notice that the plaintiff is seeking to unmask his identity.
Federal cases applying the general framework of Sony or Dendrite include Raw
Films, Ltd. v. Does, No. 11-7248, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41645, at *22 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 23, 2012); Cornelius v. DeLuca, No. 1:10-CV-027-BLW, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27213, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 15, 2011), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, S103, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, L.L.C., 441 Fed. Appx. 431 (9th
Cir. 2011); In re Rule 45 Subpoena, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40653 at *22; Fodor
v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49672 at *8; Doe I, & Doe II, 561 F. Supp. 2d at
254-55; and Highfields Capital Mgmt. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 380, 385 (2005).
But see Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Does 1-10, No. MC 11-00096-PHX-FJM,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128292, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2011) (holding that the
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it was not in Sony, the court may apply the "most exacting
standard" for overcoming the discovery privilege that has yet been
articulated:" the "summary judgment" standard adopted by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Cahill.16  Whatever standard is
applied, the anonymous speaker need not prove anything to assert
the privilege; the initial burden is on the plaintiff.8
B. Anonymous Speaker Privilege Addressed by Federal Courts of
Appeals
Pre-Intemet cases involving the compelled unmasking of an
anonymous speaker by means of discovery are scarce: the Sixth
and Fourth Circuits each decided one. The many district court
decisions on the privilege in the last few years reflect the extent to
which anonymous communication via the Internet has become the
privilege can be overcome if the plaintiff meets the "heightened" pleading
standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009)).
84 Whether or not the speech at issue has been properly characterized as
"purely expressive" or "intermediate" is not an issue undertaken in this Article.
8In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011).
86 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). Federal courts that have applied the
"summary judgment" standard include Quixtar, Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team,
LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1216 (D. Nev. 2008); Ecommerce Innovations,
L.L.C. v. Does 1-10, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99325, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25,
2008); and Best Western Int'l, v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56014, at *11 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006). It should be noted,
however, that the summary judgment standard employed in regard to the
anonymous speaker privilege is akin to the prima facie standard because the
plaintiff cannot demonstrate the absence of a disputed issue of fact before it has
obtained discovery of all the relevant facts in the case. Thus, a court applying
the "summary judgment" standard explained: "[A] plaintiff at an early stage of
the litigation may not possess information about the role played by particular
defendants or other evidence that normally would be obtained through
discovery. But a plaintiff must produce such evidence as it has to establish a
prima facie case of the claims asserted in its complaint." Best Western, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56014, at *12.
87 A different rule may apply if the party objecting to disclosure does not
admit to having been the anonymous speaker. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Doe, 138 Cal. App. 4th 872, (6th Cir. 2006).
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norm." Because discovery disputes are not generally appealable
on an interlocutory basis,89 and because the vast majority of cases
settle before trial,90 relatively few of these decisions on the
anonymous online speaker privilege have reached the appellate
level in the short period of time the privilege has been widely
invoked. Examining the few decisions by the courts of appeal, it
can be concluded that the courts have sanctioned a general
discovery privilege of anonymity based on the First Amendment,
though without directly identifying the specific body of First
Amendment law that supports the privilege. Instead, the focus has
been on the standards for overcoming the privilege.
In the Sixth Circuit case, NLRB v. Midland Daily News,9 1 the
National Labor Relations Board sought an order compelling a
newspaper to comply with a subpoena seeking the production of
documents that would identify the source of an anonymous
advertiser. A local union had filed an unfair labor practices claim
against the advertiser, and the NLRB issued the subpoena in its
investigation of the claim.92 The district court denied the requested
relief, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed." The court neither based its
analysis or holding on the fact that the discovery would "unmask"
an anonymous speaker; nor did it discuss any First Amendment
right to speak anonymously. Instead, it simply noted there was "no
dispute" that an advertisement placed by someone who desired to
remain anonymous constituted "lawful commercial speech."94 The
court then applied settled authority that commercial speech was
88 See Salehoo Grp, v. ABC Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (W.D. Wash.
2010) ("With the expansion of online expression, the use of subpoenas to
unmask anonymous Internet speakers in connection with civil lawsuits is on the
rise.").
89 See, e.g., In re Anonymous Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1175.
90 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459,
462 (2004) (showing in a study that less than two percent of federal civil
lawsuits go to trial).
91 151 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1998).
92 Id. at 473.
93 Id. at 473-74.
94 Id. at 475.
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entitled to First Amendment protection against "unwarranted
government regulation."9 5 The court concluded that compelling
compliance with the subpoena would be "unwarranted" because,
on one hand, forcing disclosure "may discourage anonymous
employment advertisements generally and thereby chill the lawful
commercial speech of periodicals and employers nationwide," and,
on the other, the underlying claim lacked "any factual support" and
the NLRB had not "implemented a less intrusive means to conduct
its investigation." 6
In the other pre-Internet case, Lejkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers,
Inc.," a securities fraud class action, a nonparty witness claimed a
First Amendment right to remain anonymous. The witness
objected to a subpoena for deposition on this ground.98 Although
the district court in Massachusetts, where the subpoena had issued,
rejected the objection, the court entered a protective order
precluding the deposing attorneys from disclosing the identity of
the witness, even to their clients." After the deposition, the
defendant in the action moved for an order unsealing the
deposition and allowing further discovery from the John Doe
witness. The district court granted partial relief, allowing the
attorneys to disclose the identity of the witness to the parties and
pursue discovery but precluding the parties from making the
information known to the public."oo Ruling on an interlocutory
appeal, the Fourth Circuit relied in part on McIntyre, stating that:
"The First Amendment does appear to include some aspect of
anonymity in protecting free speech."' However, "[c]ourts have
typically protected anonymity under the First Amendment when
claimed in connection with literary, religious, or political
9 Id. at 474 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (emphasis omitted)).
96 1d at 475.
97 577 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2009).
9 Id. at 242.
9 Id. The witness did not appeal the decision of the district court in
Massachusetts. Id.
100 Id
1os Id at 248.
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speech." 0 2 Because the speech at issue constituted "commercial
speech," it was entitled only to a "limited measure of protection,"
that would be overcome by "a substantial governmental interest in
disclosure so long as disclosure advances that interest and goes no
further than reasonably necessary."0 3 Because the party seeking
disclosure demonstrated that discovery of the Doe client's identity
and information from it would provide "relevant and useful""
information, the governmental interest in disclosure outweighed
the "qualified privilege"' 5 and the court affirmed the district
court's order.'06
The anonymous speaker privilege asserted to protect
noncommercial anonymous speech captured the Second Circuit's
attention in Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3."o' Plaintiff recording
companies alleged that John Doe defendants infringed copyrights
by downloading and distributing music and issued a subpoena to
the defendants' ISP to obtain their identities. The Doe defendants
moved to quash on the grounds, inter alia, that disclosure would
violate First Amendment rights.'o The district court affirmed the
magistrate judge's denial of the motion, Doe 3 appealed, and the
court of appeals in turn also affirmed.' On the question whether
an anonymous speaker privilege exists, the court, citing Buckley,"o
McIntyre,"' and Patterson,"12 simply stated: "To the extent that
anonymity is protected by the First Amendment, a court should
102 Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Conm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342-43
(1995); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-
67 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc, 525 U.S. 182, 197-
204 (1999)).
103 Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
104 Id. at 249.
ios Id. at 248.
106 Id. at 249.
107 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010).
'
0 Id. at 113.
10' Id. at 116.
"o 525 U.S. 182, 199-200 (1999).
.. 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995).
112 357 U.S. 449, 462, 466 (1958).
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quash or modify a subpoena designed to breach anonymity.""' In
evaluating the lower courts' decision not to quash, the court rather
generally referred to "the qualified privilege" at issue.114 The court
found no abuse of discretion in the district court's application of
the Sony Music Entertainment"' standard for determining whether
the plaintiff could overcome the privilege." 6
Subsequently, in In re Anonymous Online Speakers,"' the
Ninth Circuit considered a petition for a writ of mandamus filed on
behalf of three online speakers-not parties to the lawsuit-whose
identity the district court ordered be disclosed after a deponent
refused to name them. According to the plaintiff, statements made
by these speakers in various online forums supported its claim
against the defendant for tortious interference."' The court began
its analysis with the familiar litany recited by the district courts:
Talley and McIntyre establish that the First Amendment protects
anonymous speech, and speech on the Internet "stands on the same
footing" as other speech."' As the Second Circuit had referenced
Patterson'2 0 in its analysis, the Ninth referred to Perry v.
Schwarzenegger,I2 a case involving the interplay between
compelled disclosure during discovery and First Amendment
associational rights. The court distinguished Perry because that
case involved a discovery request for political campaign
information, not commercial speech-as in the case at bar-and
did not involve an anonymous speaker.'22 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit did not reach the issue of whether or how Perry would bear
on a case involving the compelled disclosure of anonymous
political speech. Nor did the court otherwise explore the First
" Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 118 (2nd Cir. 2010).
114 Ic. at 119.
" Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
116 Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 119.
... 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
"' Id. at 1172.
'19 Id. at 1173.
120 357 U.S. 449 (2001).
12 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010).
122 In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1174.
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Amendment basis for an anonymous speaker privilege. 123 Instead,
the opinion turns on what standard should be employed to
overcome the privilege.
In this regard, the court expressed some misgivings about
imposing new evidentiary requirements on the plaintiff.124  After
summarizing the different standards used for evaluating the
sufficiency of the plaintiff s case, the court noted:
Interestingly, in each of these cases, the initial burden rests on the party
seeking discovery and requires varying degrees of proof of the
underlying claim. In Perry [v. Schwarzenegger], however, we
evaluated the First Amendment political associational rights separately
from the underlying claims and adopted a "heightened relevance
standard" requiring plaintiffs to "demonstrate[ ] an interest in obtaining
the disclosures . . . which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect . . .
on the free exercise . . . of [the] constitutionally protected right of
association."1 25
It was not necessary for the court to pursue this observation-and
decide whether "heightened relevance" would be sufficient to
overcome the privilege-because the plaintiff had met the new
evidentiary requirements and discovery had been ordered. In
regard to the summary judgment standard the district court had
applied, the Ninth Circuit did not agree that this was appropriate
given that this "highest level" should be reserved for political
speech, and the speech at issue was not "expressly political."'2 6
The error was harmless, however, because the plaintiff, having
cleared the highest bar-the district court had ordered disclosure-
would necessarily have cleared the lower bar, as well."
123 In its unreported decision in S103, Inc. v. Bodybuilding. com, LLC, 441
F.App'x 431 (9th Cir. 2011), the court remanded for further proceedings to
determine what standard should be applied given that it was unclear, on the
record, whether the speech at issue was commercial or noncommercial. As in In
re Anonymous Speakers, the court did not in this case address the First
Amendment foundations for the privilege. See id.
124 In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176.
125 Id. (citations omitted).
12 6 Id. at 1176-77.
127 Id. at 1177. Given the outcome, the court did not have to categorize the
speech as "commercial" or "noncommercial."
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In sum, a John Doe defendant in the federal courts whose
anonymous online speech has given rise to allegations of
wrongdoing may assert a First Amendment privilege against
compelled disclosure of identity. By and large, the existence of
that privilege is predicated on the Talley line of Supreme Court
cases. However, no court has fully analyzed how, if at all, the
anonymous speaker privilege flows from those cases. And,
particularly in the courts of appeal, a related but separate body of
law defining the role of the associational privilege in discovery
regularly appears, if somewhat tangentially, in the overall picture.
The time is ripe to move the associational privilege to center stage
as the proper foundation for the anonymous speaker privilege.
When that shift is made, the standard for applying the privilege
will also be clear: The initial burden will shift back to the party
seeking to invoke the privilege-onto the John Doe defendant-
and a showing of "heightened relevance" by the plaintiff will be
the standard for overcoming the privilege.
C. Practical Implications of the New Standards
The anonymous speaker privilege may foreclose proceedings
on the merits at the pleading stage if the plaintiff does not meet his
evidentiary burden on every element of his claims. If the majority
of plaintiffs in the reported cases win this discovery dispute, some
lose. For example, in Salehoo Group v. ABC Co.,'2 8 the court
granted the anonymous defendant's motion to quash, finding that
Salehoo did not adduce sufficient evidence of confusion, an
element of its trademark infringement claim, though the defendant
used "SaleHoo" all over its website. In Dendrite International,
Inc. v. Doe,'29 the plaintiff alleged that Internet postings accusing
the company of accounting and operational problems were
defamatory. The court found there was insufficient proof of
damages, even though the submission of a certification from the
president and stock trading records evidenced a loss, albeit,
arguably, a "minor" diminution in stock value.'30 Had these cases
128 722 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
129 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
30 Id. at 772.
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proceeded through the "normal" discovery process, the plaintiff
may well have obtained evidence from the defendant in support of
its claims, and, perhaps, sufficient additional evidence to win a
jury verdict in its favor.
The trial court's order denying discovery of the identity of a
John Doe would in many instances become tantamount to a final
judgment because service cannot be affected and the case is
dismissed.'"' The order of dismissal is of course appealable.'3 2 But
because the issue on appeal is a discovery order, the trial court's
decision will presumably be evaluated by an abuse of discretion
standard.' Hence, one critic dubbed the anonymous speaker
privilege a preliminary "unregulated judicial 'gut check' " of the
merits of the case.134
From a larger perspective, the anonymous speaker privilege
may discourage parties from filing suit at all. If, as a result, only
"frivolous" lawsuits designed solely to stifle legitimate anonymous
speech are precluded, this is not a cost but, instead, a benefit of this
new discovery rule.' But there is no good data supporting the
proposition that only frivolous lawsuits would be filtered out. Nor
13 The case may, of course, involve multiple defendants, some of whom are
identified, in which event the court's resolution of the discovery issue does not
end the case.
132 Whether or not the discovery order would be appealable before final
judgment is a close question that is not addressed here. See Mohawk Indus, Inc.
v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (holding that discovery orders denying
claims of attorney-client privilege are not appealable under the collateral order
doctrine).
133 If the question on appeal involves the nature or extent of the discovery
privilege-whether a summary judgment or prima facie standard should be
applied, for example-that would be a question of law. But insofar as the
application of the standard is concerned, the standard on review would
presumptively be abuse of discretion.
134 Vogel, supra note 12, at 809.
' For the proposition that lawsuits tempting to unmask John Doe defendants
are being used for this purpose see, for example, John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884
A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005) ("The goals of this new breed of libel action are
largely symbolic, the primary goal being to silence John Doe and others like
him." (citing Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse
in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 860 (2000))).
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are there empirical studies demonstrating that cases seeking to
unmask anonymous speakers are proportionately more likely to be
frivolous than any other type of case: If that were so, the sacrifice
of some legitimate claims might be worth the avoidance of an
undue number of illegitimate claims. In any event, some number
of truly injured parties will refrain from entering the fray at all,
faced with the new burdens on prosecuting a case. From this
perspective, the practical outcome of the anonymous speaker
privilege is preventing justice, and reducing the deterrent effect of
a possible lawsuit on those who abuse or otherwise use the Internet
for bullying or entrapment.
And those plaintiffs bold enough to embark on litigation
against an anonymous online speaker and confront the anonymous
speaker privilege will be required to spend more time and money
to litigate. Moreover, this investment will be required at the
earliest stages of the lawsuit. For example, the plaintiff in S103,
Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com'36 incurred attorneys' fees and costs for
the motion to compel in the district court, the appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, and the additional trial court proceedings on this discovery
issue ordered by the circuit court before the litigation truly began.
In some cases, expert testimony may also be required to overcome
the privilege,'" rendering the overall cost of initiating the lawsuit
quite considerable.13 8
Taking into account the actual and potential costs of the
anonymous speaker privilege, and the significant protections
already in place in the civil justice system to prevent unwarranted
lawsuits arising from speech,' it is worth ensuring that the
136 441 F. App'x 431 (9th Cir. 2011).
137 Experts may be required in claims involving securities fraud or intellectual
property infringement, for example, to adduce sufficient evidence regarding
elements of those claims. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 12, at 850.
13 id.
139 These include Rule 11, motions to dismiss and for summary judgment,
and, when the lawsuit is specifically directed at speech, "anti-SLAPP" statutes,
which provide for an early assessment of the validity of the lawsuit. See Vess v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing
California's anti-SLAPP statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a)).
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anonymous speaker privilege is well justified on First Amendment
grounds. Part III examines the fit between the First Amendment
precedent cited in its support and the anonymous speaker privilege
as currently applied.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND INDIVIDUAL ANONYMOUS
SPEECH
First, this Part traces the origins of the right to anonymous
speech: a genesis that long predates the Internet. The Article then
switches from the stately cadence of the Supreme Court to the
casual parlance of the Internet, and focuses on exactly what
"anonymous speech" means in its online incarnation. From this
perspective, the First Amendment right to speak anonymously
justified by, inter alia, the Federalist Papers, does not translate
readily to anonymous or pseudonymous bloggers on Twitter or
Facebook.
A. Supreme Court Decisions: Talley et al.
The Supreme Court has spoken definitively on an individual's
First Amendment right to "anonymous speech" in a line of cases
beginning with Talley v. California.'40 In each of these cases the
Supreme Court struck down laws that required disclosure of
identity as a precondition to speech on the grounds that the First
Amendment protects anonymous speech.'41 As noted above, the
existence of the anonymous speaker privilege relies heavily on this
line of cases.'42 This Article suggests, however, that the Talley line
of cases provides little support for the anonymous speaker
discovery privilege.'43
In Talley, a Los Angeles ordinance prohibited the distribution
of handbills not displaying the name of the person who printed or
wrote the handbill. 44 Talley was arrested and convicted of
140 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
141 d
142 See supra text accompanying notes 26-87.
143 This same argument was made by another commentator but on different
grounds than are proposed herein. See Vogel, supra note 12, at 831-40.
4 Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61.
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distributing handbills urging a boycott of local merchants; the
handbills did not display his name.'45 Noting the historical and
political significance of anonymous speech, including the impact
of the anonymously published Federalist Papers, and finding that
the identification requirement would undoubtedly restrict the
freedom of anonymous expression, the Court struck down the
ordinance.'4 6 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,'47 an
Ohio statute prohibited the distribution of any publication designed
to promote or defeat a candidate or an issue unless the publication
contained the name of the organization or individual publisher.
Echoing Talley, the Court in McIntyre referenced the "honorable
tradition" of anonymous pamphleteering,'48 noted the role of
anonymity as a "shield from the tyranny of the majority" which is
the very purpose of the First Amendment,'49 and struck down the
statute.'o More recent Supreme Court cases reach the same
result."'
The specific defect in the laws at issue in these cases was that
they swept too broadly, prohibiting-or unduly burdening-
15 Id. at 61.
146 Id. at 64-65.
147 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
1d at 357.
149 id10Id.
15' In Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999), the
Court addressed statutory requirements for the initiation of a ballot referendum
in Colorado. By statute, in order to circulate a petition to initiate a ballot
initiative, the circulators were required to, inter alia, wear an identification
badge. Id. at 186. The Court found this "injury to speech" to be even greater
than that posed by the statute at issue in McIntyre, because petition circulation is
a "less fleeting encounter" than distributing handbills, and struck down the
requirement. Id. at 199. In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 154 (2002), an ordinance of the Village of Stratton
prohibited "canvassing" on residential property unless the canvasser had
obtained a permit. The ordinance further required that the canvasser display the
permit-which contained the name of the canvasser-at demand of the
canvassee. Id. at 155. The Court noted several Constitutional infirmities in this
provision of the ordinance, including the facts that it prevented canvassers from
retaining their anonymity and could preclude persons from canvassing for
unpopular causes. Id. at 167.
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anonymous speech that was not in some regard "wrongful." 5 2 The
Court made it quite clear that if the challenged laws had prohibited
only wrongful speech-anonymous or not-different
considerations would be brought to bear."' For example, in Talley,
the city argued that the ordinance was justified because it was
intended to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising,
or libel.'54 The Court rejected that argument, not because
anonymous libel is protected by the First Amendment,"' but
because the ordinance was not limited to fraudulent, false, or
libelous anonymous speech."' Thus, the Court did not "pass on
the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent[ing] these or any
other supposed evils.""' Similarly, in McIntyre,"' the Court
contrasted the "blanket anonymity prohibition" in the offending
statute with specific measures that could be taken in the event of
wrongful speech, including the "enforcement of defamation
torts.""' In other words, if Mrs. McIntyre had anonymously
distributed handbills accusing one of the politicians involved in the
referendum of embezzlement and been sued, that tort could still be
"enforced." The McIntyre opinion does not suggest that the
152 Another difference between the state action at issue in the Talley line of
cases and the enforcement of a subpoena in civil discovery is that the former
constitutes a "prior restraint" on speech that is "highly disfavored." See Vogel,
supra note 12, at 837 ("First, while the Talley line of cases establishes that the
First Amendment can in some circumstances protect a speaker's anonymity,
those cases are limited by the fact that they arise in the special, and highly
disfavored, context of prior restraints."). To be sure, a court order compelling
discovery in a private civil lawsuit constitutes state action that is subject to First
Amendment constraints, but such an order does not constitute a prior restraint.
See Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091-92 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
'53 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
154 id.
1 Libel is not protected by the First Amendment. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("[T]here is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact.").
156 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
'57 Id.
11 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
1591 d. at 351.
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"enforcement" procedure for an allegedly defamatory statement
should be altered-that a discovery privilege could be invoked, for
example-if the allegedly wrongful speech was made
anonymously.
However, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,60 the Supreme
Court did alter the "enforcement procedure" for defamation
lawsuits against the press in order to reduce the chilling effect on
legitimate speech protected by the First Amendment caused by the
threat of a meritless lawsuit.161 Specifically, the Supreme Court
imposed additional evidentiary burdens to protect First
Amendment press freedoms, creating a "constitutional privilege"
for the speaker.162  Arguably, the First Amendment similarly
supports an altered enforcement procedure for defamation suits
against anonymous speakers in order to reduce the chilling effect
on legitimate anonymous speech.
This argument is undermined, however, by the line drawn in
Herbert v. Lando,'61 in which the Court declined to create a First
Amendment discovery privilege, notwithstanding the potential
"chilling effect" on speech that would result, because of the
countervailing interest in providing injured parties their day in
court. In Herbert, the plaintiff brought a defamation lawsuit
against members of the press, and one of the defendants, Lando,
objected to discovery regarding information about the "editorial
process" on the ground that such information was privileged
pursuant to the First Amendment.'" The Court explained the
conflicting principles as follows:
[I]n the 15 years since New York Times, the doctrine announced by that
case, which represented a major development and which was widely
perceived as essentially protective of press freedoms, has been
repeatedly affirmed as the appropriate First Amendment standard
160 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
161 Id.; see Gertz, v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech
that matters.").
162 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.
163 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
"MId. at 156.
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applicable in libel actions brought by public officials and public
figures. At the same time, however, the Court has reiterated its
conviction-reflected in the laws of defamation of all of the States-
that the individual's interest in his reputation is also a basic concern.16 5
Lando argued that requiring disclosure of information about the
editorial process and editorial decision-making would violate the
First Amendment because disclosure would have "an intolerable
chilling effect" on those processes.166  The Court rejected that
argument, noting that to the extent wrongful speech would be
"chilled," or inhibited by the risk of potential liability, that effect
was fully consistent with the First Amendment.167 It rejected the
notion that innocent speech would also be discouraged because
there was no true risk of liability.'16  Acknowledging that a lawsuit
is costly, so that proving innocence is a burden that might
adversely affect the press and impinge on First Amendment
considerations, the Court nonetheless declined to impose a
discovery privilege to advance those considerations.' 61 "Only
complete immunity from liability for defamation" would insulate
innocent speech from the burden of a lawsuit, "and the Court has
regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the First
Amendment."' Referring again to the "right to every man's
evidence," the Court held that Lando had not made a "clear and
165 Id. at 169 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC,
493 U.S. 182 (1990), the Court rejected a university "peer review" privilege
against discovery, notwithstanding the claim that compelling disclosure would
have a "chilling effect" on "candid evaluations and discussions of candidates."
Id. at 197. The Court held:
We do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it "promotes
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative
evidence . . . ." Inasmuch as "testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges
contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right to every
man's evidence," any such privilege must be strictly construed.
Id. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980)
(quoting another source)).
1 "Herbert, 441 U.S. at 171.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 172.
169 Id.
'
70 Id. at 176.
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convincing" case for "placing beyond the plaintiffs reach a range
of direct evidence" relevant to proving his case.' 7'
Clearly, then, the new "anonymous speaker privilege" must
promote "sufficiently important interests" to outweigh the
plaintiffs need to obtain the identity of the speaker. As argued
above, the decisions in the Talley line of cases do not alone support
the conclusion that it does. Whether the more general First
Amendment principles expressed in these cases support the
existence of the new privilege is examined, with a focus on
anonymous online speech, in Part III.B.
B. Anonymous Speech Online
The Talley line of cases include sweeping comments on the
value of anonymous speech that arguably support the more general
proposition that "[t]he First Amendment does appear to include
some aspect of anonymity in protecting free speech.""' The Court
in Talley proclaimed: "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures
and even books have played an important role in the progress of
mankind.""' The historical significance of the Federalist
Papers-and the fact that these were published under
pseudonyms-is regularly cited in support of the value of
anonymous speech.17 The contribution of speech to society, in the
eyes of the Supreme Court, is not limited to core political speech:
Anonymity may be instrumental in promoting the interests of
social justice,"'7  for example, and the ability to publish
anonymously has produced great literature."'
'7' Id. at 169-70.
172 Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 248 (4th Cir. 2009).
1 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
174 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43
(1995).
's See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64 ("Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.").
176 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 ("Whatever the motivation may be, at least
in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter
the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in
requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.").
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Arguably, these dicta support some enhanced measure of
protection for anonymous speech-more than is afforded editorial
decision-making. But if so, most anonymous online speech would
seem to be the least likely candidate for that protection, for several
reasons. Before returning to this argument, let us examine the
nature of anonymous speech on the Internet.
Consider William Jones, who uses a proprietary, employer-
provided e-mail service for work and a commercial service for
personal e-mail. As is common, the proprietary e-mail service sets
rules for the username William can use: first initial of first name,
followed by no more than five letters or numbers, for example.
Duplicates are not allowed. William tries to enter "wjones" but
that user name is taken. He succeeds with "wjone4." William
wants to choose a materially different username for his personal
account to avoid any risk that his personal comments could be
attributed to his employment status. Many of William's friends,
with whom he regularly corresponds via e-mail, are, like William,
rabid Dodgers fans, so he chooses "kershawkid" for his personal
username. From the content of William's e-mail, most of his e-
mail friends quickly come to realize that kershawkid is William
Jones. William blogs about baseball, and, like all the other
bloggers on the sites he visits, William uses a username to blog.
He uses kershawkid when he blogs about baseball, simply because
he doesn't want to have to remember too many usernames. But he
does use a different username-"MrEd99," say-when he blogs
about other subjects, primarily because he has read the literature
cautioning against using the same username and password for
multiple purposes because of the risk of "identity theft." Finally,
William frequently visits Second Life, where he has a screen name
that is different from his username, neither of which is his real
name. But whenever he meets anyone at Second Life, his avatar
tells the truth about William's upbringing, education, job, and
other aspects of his life, because he hopes that one day he'll meet
that special someone who will also be interested in him as a real
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person. The speech from any of William's various pseudonyms
could become the subject of a private civil lawsuit.'"
As should be evident from this generic description of
anonymous online speech, it differs from "real" anonymous speech
in several ways. First, anonymity online is the rule, not the
exception."' William is always anonymous, because the rules of
the road require it or just because everyone else is acting this way.
Certainly not all speech on the Internet is anonymous: A podcast
by a popular news anchorperson, for example, is obviously not
anonymous speech. But anonymity is the accepted practice. First
Amendment jurisprudence lauds anonymous speech because it is
special-extols "Publius"'79 or Mark Twain,'" for example-but
that gloss fades online, where anonymity is just not at all special.
To the extent that the anonymous speaker privilege was created to
encourage and support anonymous online speech, such
encouragement is simply not necessary.
Second, anonymity online is rarely chosen specifically to
protect the anonymity of the speaker. Again, the rules of
communication via the Internet simply require some degree of
anonymity, or the speaker chooses anonymity just because
everyone else is acting this way. Fictitious names are also used to
prevent data theft, or, particularly on the mammoth social
networking sites, because it is quicker and easier to pick something
whimsical than find some version of one's real name that has not
already been taken. This issue of choosing-or not choosing-
anonymity appears to have some bearing on the importance of
protecting anonymous speech. Thus: "[A]n author's decision to
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or
additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the
17 The blogs are obvious candidates, and, assuming William sometimes
speaks in a forum, his avatar could get in trouble. An e-mail from wjone4 or
kershawkid could be "blasted" to a recipient's own private e-mail list. Jane, one
of the secondary recipients, could read William's e-mail and believes it to be
defamatory.
178 See Durkee, supra note 41, at 780 (stating that anonymity is "by default").
' See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6.
so Id. at 341 n.4.
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freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.""' This
feature of protected anonymous speech is virtually absent online.
Third, there is no one type of anonymity on the Internet, and
most versions are not actually very anonymous. William is really
not very anonymous as wjone4-everybody at work could identify
the speaker-and this level of anonymity seems little worth
protecting. But what if the plaintiffs attorney did not know, or
have any way to find out without deposing William, where he
works? William is not much more anonymous, at least to his
friends, as kershawkid, but counsel would have even less chance of
finding William as kershawkid than as wjone4. William is
somewhat anonymous as MrEd99, although William should be
aware-because the facts are generally known-that his true
identity could easily be discovered by various lawful (e.g.,
government wiretapping) as well as illicit means (e.g., "hacking").
William's name itself is most protected on Second Life, but
anyone he speaks to knows everything about him except his name:
an odd kind of anonymity, indeed. None of William's online
identities are, then, particularly anonymous at all. But if some
higher degree of anonymity should be protected, but not all, what
sensible rule could be devised to determine what degree of
anonymity was sufficient to enjoy a privilege from disclosure?
Thus, in general, anonymous online speech does not have the
attributes of the "real" anonymous speech of which the Supreme
Court has spoken within the context of First Amendment rights.18 2
Moreover, to the extent First Amendment rights are accorded
anonymous speech in order to protect the speaker from "the
tyranny of the majority,""' that protection is arguably unnecessary
online. Instead, technology can be used. A speaker wishing to
remain truly anonymous can use an "anonymizer" or other
specialized technology securely to protect against the disclosure of
identity.184 Thus, if the Talley line of cases casts a penumbra that
'81 Id. at 342.
182 See id. at 357.
183 Id.
184 An anonymizer is the moniker for tools that protect against the disclosure
of identity online. See Anonymizer, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An
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would justify a new First Amendment discovery privilege to
protect anonymous speech, it seems unlikely that it would cover a
significant volume of what is collectively deemed "anonymous
online speech" today. 185
If these arguments are correct, when "noguano," on an Internet
bulletin board open to the public, accuses officers and directors of
a company of being "[1]ying, cheating, thieving, stealing, lowlife
criminals!!!!,"6 he cannot resist disclosure of his true identity in a
subsequent lawsuit. If this outcome does not fall afoul of the First
Amendment, as this Article argues here, it is also the more just.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO
AssoCIATIONAL ANONYMITY
Though the Talley line of cases does not provide significant
support for the proposition animating the new discovery
privilege-that the identity of an anonymous speaker whose
onymizer (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). The IP addresses of users of a data haven
cannot be obtained from a third party-absent extraordinary means-and users'
identity is otherwise protected from any possible association with the posted
speech. See What is Freenet?, THE FREENET PROJECT, https://freenetproject.org/
whatis.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). Thus, an anonymous speaker using an
anonymizer needs no First Amendment protection against the tyranny of the
majority and needs no discovery privilege to protect against disclosure of
identity; the anonymizer performs that function. See id.
185 The case could perhaps be made that certain categories of online speech
are more like "real" anonymous speech that would be protected by the
implications of the Talley line of cases. As noted by Durkee, different "online
spaces" have different characteristics, some of which "have sophisticated
mechanisms to ensure that comments are accurate and some of which serve as
forums for factual discourse." Durkee, supra note 41, at 794. Durkee argues
that because of this fact, "merely asserting that speech occurred 'on the Internet'
is insufficient in assessing both the level of First Amendment protections and the
scope or severity of harm." Id. She suggests that the context of the online
speech should be considered in making that assessment and notes that the
"anonymous speech jurisprudence" of the Supreme Court "has long recognized
the importance of context in weighing the competing interests of speakers and
audience." Id. at 819.
186 Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090. (W.D. Wash.
2001).
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speech is alleged to have been wrongful is protected by the First
Amendment from disclosure during discovery-another line of
Supreme Court authority firmly does. That is, the well-established
"associational privilege" may, given the right circumstances,
protect against the disclosure of the identity of an anonymous
online speaker.'" Part IV.A, below, reviews the "offline" legal
framework of this privilege, and Part IV.B explores how this
privilege should be applied in the online world. Part IV.C
contrasts the outcomes when the associational privilege is applied
instead of the anonymous speaker privilege.
A. The "Associational Privilege "from Discovery ofIdentity
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the "associational
privilege," which protects anonymous membership in a group. 8 8
In the seminal case, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,'" the
Court held that Alabama could not compel the NAACP to reveal to
the state's Attorney General lists of its members' names and
addresses. The state sought this information via subpoena after
alleging that the NAACP failed to comply with statutory
requirements for "doing business" in the state.'90 The Court found
that "compelled disclosure" of the members' names would likely
violate the rights of the NAACP and its members to advocate
collectively because of their fear of the consequences should the
members' identities be known.'9 '
1 Another privilege grounded in the First Amendment that would indirectly
protect against the disclosure of the identity of an online speaker-because he or
she is a news source-is the "reporter's privilege." See, e.g., Anne M.
Macrander, Bloggers as Newsmen: Expanding the Testimonial Privilege, 88
B.U. L. REv. 1075 (2008). This Article does not venture into this topic or
address the arguments regarding the "boundaries (or existence) of any
privilege." See id. at 1085. Instead, this discussion is limited to the nature and
extent of any discovery privilege based on the First Amendment that an
anonymous speaker can directly assert.
' See, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 467 (1958).
189 Id.
19 0 Id. at 466.
' Id. at 462-63. The Patterson court noted the negative effects of compelled
disclosure:
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A qualified discovery privilege has been derived from the right
of associational privacy established in Patterson that applies to
compelled disclosure of the identity of an association's members. 19 2
The privilege also conditionally protects against disclosure of "any
similar information that goes to the heart of an organization's
associational activities . . . ."'" For example, these "associational
activities" include views expressed at association meetings,'94
communications among members related to a political campaign
strategy,'9 5 or "strategic lobbying materials."'9 6 In the view of the
Ninth Circuit, the type of information that may be subject to the
privilege is virtually unlimited: If disclosure of the information
would deter protected associational activities, the privilege may be
[Compelled disclosure would] affect adversely the ability [of the NAACP]
and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they
admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to
withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because
of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of
the consequences of this exposure.
Id.
192 See, e.g., Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1264-66 (D.C. Cir.
1981), vacated mem. sub nom. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118
(1982); Marfork Coal Co. v. Smith, 274 F.R.D. 193, 205-206 (S.D. W.Va.
2011); Christ Covenant Church v. Town of Southwest Ranches, No. 07-60516-
CIV-DIMITROULEAS/ROSENBAUM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49483, at *16
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2008) ("Thus, a qualified First Amendment associational
privilege exists in the discovery context, potentially exempting a party from
having to respond to infringing discovery requests.").
19 Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6127, at *9
(N.D. Ill. May 5, 2001).
194 DeGregory v. Att'y Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 828-30 (1966).
195 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1162. (9th Cir. 2009).
196 See In re Motor Fuel Temp. Sales Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 482 (10th
Cir. 2011).
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asserted.197 The privilege may be asserted by the association
itself'" or by an individual member of the association.'
The privilege is most often asserted when the association is
political or religious.2 " But in Patterson, the Court made it clear
that the First Amendment associational privilege applies "whether
the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious, or cultural matters." 201' This breadth
of protection of association activities harkens to the same breadth
of protection for speech itself. It would be reasonable, then, to
employ the same rules in this context: So long as the activities of
the association are not strictly "commercial," those activities are
entitled to a substantial measure of First Amendment protection.202
Though the exact contours of the privilege are the subject of
some debate,203 the law is fairly clear regarding the general
" Perry, 591 F.3d at 1162 ("The existence of a prima facie case [for claiming
the protection of the privilege] turns not on the type of information sought, but
on whether disclosure of the information will have a deterrent effect on the
exercise of protected activities.").
198 See Christ Covenant Church v. Town of Southwest Ranches, No. 07-
60516-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/ROSENBAUM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49483,
at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2008).
199 See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel, 641 F.3d at 482 (motioning to quash filed by
retail members of trade association); Perry, 591 F.3d at 1152 (objecting to
disclosure made by official proponents of Proposition 8 as well as the campaign
committee).
200 See generally, e.g., Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6127 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2001).
201 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
202 Cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)
("[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.").
203 There is some debate in the courts as to whether the rules should be varied
somewhat depending on whether the party objecting to disclosure is the plaintiff
(arguably deserving of less protection) or the defendant. See Grandbouche v.
Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Britt v. Superior Court,
575 P.2d 766, 775 (1978) (en banc)) ("[W]hile the filing of a lawsuit may
implicitly bring about a partial waiver of one's constitutional right of
associational privacy, the scope of such 'waiver' must be narrowly rather than
expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from
instituting lawsuits by the fear of exposure of their private associational
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contours of the associational privilege, and what the party seeking
disclosure must show to overcome the privilege." As is usual
when a discovery privilege is invoked, the party claiming the
benefit of the privilege bears the initial burden of showing its
applicability. 205 To claim the privilege the party must make a
factual showing that disclosure would have an adverse effect on his
associational rights. If this showing is made, the privilege can be
overcome by a demonstration of a specific need for disclosure.
In Patterson,20 6 the Court noted that the NAACP had exhibited
an "uncontroverted showing" of certain harassment. But later
cases have established that no such concrete showing is necessary
to assert the privilege. Instead, the party asserting the privilege
"must demonstrate . . . a 'prima facie showing of arguable first
amendment infringement.' "207 Otherwise stated, the movant need
only show that "there is some probability that disclosure will lead
to reprisal or harassment," 208 or a "reasonable probability." 209 This
prima facie showing requires the party opposing disclosure to
demonstrate some probability that disclosure would result in
"threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties. The proof may include, for example, specific
affiliations and activities."). But, however that debate is resolved, in the
circumstances presented in this Article-the party objecting to disclosure is a
defendant-the "strongest" protection would presumably apply.
204 These rules apply whether the party seeking disclosure is a private litigant
or a government agency. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp.
202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
205 See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel Temp. Sales Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 492
(10th Cir. 2011).
206 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
207 Brock v. Local 375, Plumbers Int'l Union of Am., 860 F.2d 346, 349-50
(9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (quoting U.S. v. Trader's State Bank, 695 F.2d
1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Christ Covenant Church v. Town of
Southwest Ranches, No. 07-60516-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/ROSENBAUM,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49483, at *17 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2008).
208 Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1267-68 (D.C. Ct. App.
1981), vacated mem. sub. nom. Smith v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118
(1982).
209 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 75 Civ. 5388
(MJL), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22188, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1985).
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evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their
associational ties, or of harassment directed against the
organization itself."210  The privilege may be established by
evidence of "harassment, membership withdrawal, or
discouragement of new members, or other consequences which
objectively suggest an impact on, or 'chilling' of, the members'
associational rights." 2 1' The claim of privilege grows stronger as
the danger to associational rights increases.2 12
The prima facie showing of infringement is not necessarily a
high evidentiary threshold. Though the movant must show some
facts showing infringement, the burden is "light" in view of the
"crucial place speech and associational rights occupy under our
constitution." 2 13 For example, an affidavit showing the beliefs and
practices of the association are "controversial and subject to
occasionally overt hostility"214 meets the requirement, as does
evidence of "specific evidence of hostility" against a "main-
stream" religious sect.2 15 However, the chilling effect is not simply
210 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
211 Brock, 860 F.2d at 350.
212 See Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1267. Alternatively, if the danger is
slight, sufficient protection might be afforded by the entry of a protective order
against further disclosure of the information obtained by a party in discovery.
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1161 n.6 (9th 2010) ("A
protective order limiting the dissemination of disclosed associational
information may mitigate the chilling effect and could weigh against a showing
of infringement . . . . The mere assurance that private information will be
narrowly rather than broadly disseminated . . . however ... is not dispositive.");
see Dole v. Serv. Emps. Union, Local 280, 950 F.2d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991)
("[N]either letter suggests that it is the unlimited nature of the disclosure of the
Union minutes that underlies the member's unwillingness to attend future
meetings . . . . Rather, both letters exhibit a concern for the consequences that
would flow from any disclosure of the contents of the minutes to the
government or any government official.").
213 New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1355 (2d
Cir. 1989).214 Int '1 Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *27.
215 Christ Covenant Church v. Town of Southwest Ranches, No. 07-60516-
CIV-DIMITROULEAS/ROSENBAUM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49483, at *17
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2008).
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inferred from the fact that the discovery would disclose
associational activities or the identity of members.
Once the party opposing disclosure has made some showing of
a "chilling effect" from disclosure, "the second step of the analysis
is meant to make discovery that impacts First Amendment
associational rights available only after careful consideration of the
need for such discovery, but not necessarily to preclude it."216 The
courts do not apply a single standard in determining whether a
need for the discovery has been met, but common elements include
a "heightened relevance" of the information to the lawsuit,217 and
that "the discovery request, as framed, is the means least inclusive
and intrusive for gathering the information to which the party has
been deemed entitled." 218
B. The Associational Privilege Online
An online association or member of an association could assert
this privilege against the compelled disclosure of the identity of an
anonymous John Doe defendant. One element of what the
defendant must show before the privilege could be invoked is
clear: some evidence of harassment, membership withdrawal,
discouragement of new members, or other consequences which
suggest a reasonable possibility of a "chilling" of associational
216 Perry, 591 F.3d at 1161. The Ninth Circuit refers to this as a burden shift;
other courts simply refer to the entire analysis as a balancing test. See, e.g.,
Christ Covenant Church, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49483, at *20; Adolph Coors
Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
217 Perry, 591 F.3d at 1161 ("Importantly, the party seeking the discovery
must show that the information sought is highly relevant to the claims or
defenses in the litigation-a more demanding standard of relevance than that
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)."); Coors, 570 F. Supp. at 208
("[M]aterial sought by discovery is truly 'relevant' to the gravamen of the
complaint."); Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6127, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2001) (asserting that the information is so relevant that it
"goes to the 'heart of the matter' ").
218 Coors, 570 F. Supp. at 208; see also Perry, 591 F.3d at 1161 ("The request
must also be carefully tailored to avoid unnecessary interference with protected
activities ... and the information must be otherwise unavailable.").
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rights resulting from disclosure. 2 19 But what would establish the
initial predicate for the privilege in online situations-the existence
of an association and a set of common beliefs-and what
constitutes "membership" in that association is less clear. The
significance of the heightened relevance standard for overcoming
the privilege must also be further explored, for in none of the
decided cases is that standard applied when a single John Doe
defendant has asserted the associational privilege. Arguably, the
privilege would always be overcome-and therefore be largely
meaningless-because the identity of the defendant would meet
the highest relevance standard, unless this standard would operate
differently in the online world.
1. Defining "Association" in an Online Context
The cases defining and applying this associational privilege
had no need to dwell on the definition of "association" for
purposes of the associational privilege: The organizations or
members invoking the privilege were organized in some type of
recognized association. 220 The Oxford English Dictionary defines
an association as a "body of persons" advancing a "common
cause" or "purpose." 221 Under this definition, the associational
privilege for anonymous online speech would be broad indeed.
The Internet enables associations on an unprecedented scale and
with unprecedented ease. Millions of people from all over the
world can collectively and simultaneously follow the "tweets" of a
rock star, thereby, arguably, promoting "culture" simply by
accessing the Internet on a desktop, laptop, or smartphone.2 22 Any
person or organization can create a website and invite members to
participate in discussions, or set up a blog on Blogmaster, hosted
219 Coors, 570 F. Supp. at 210.
220 The NAACP was a nonprofit membership corporation; the Black Panthers
a political party; and in In re Motor Fuel the parties resisting disclosure were
retail members of motor fuel trade "associations." in re Motor Fuel Temp. Sales
Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 481 (10th Cir. 2011).
221 See Association, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/v
iew/Entry/1 1981?redirected From=association (last visited Dec. 15, 2012).
222 TWITTER, www.twitter.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
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by Google. 223 The ease of communication enables association on a
bewildering number of topics. For example, one of many service
providers, Yahoo! sponsors millions of free message boards and
groups for registered members. 224 Because of the ease and rapidity
of communication on the Internet, it also promotes fleeting
associations: a series of blogs on an isolated topic in the news, for
example.
Thus, unless association is more narrowly defined, Internet
associations would include virtually every online speaker. As an
evidentiary privilege, it would seem reasonable to conclude that
only an organization that has sufficient cohesive existence to sue
and be sued qua organization ought to be able to assert an
associational legal privilege. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, service on an unincorporated association is made
by "by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process."225 Following the logic of this argument, if an online
organization does not have an officer or some other managing
agent, it cannot claim the associational privilege.22 6 Few blogs, or
websites sponsored by individuals, or persons posting comments or
messages on these sites would, therefore, be able to claim the
associational privilege.
2. "Common Beliefs" in an Online Context
Assuming the existence of a cognizable association, the
association also has to be engaged in the support of "common
223 GOOGLE, www.google.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2012)
224 YAHOO!, www.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
225 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1).
226 This Article proposes that this concept-that an organization that cannot
sue or be sued cannot claim an associational privilege-be incorporated into
First Amendment jurisprudence, not the specific rules governing service.
Therefore, it would not be necessary to determine specifically what law
regarding service applied-the Federal Rules or a state code, for the latter vary
significantly-which is a difficult endeavor when behavior on the Internet is at
issue.
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beliefs" or engaged in a "collective effort." 227 Putting up a bulletin
board is not, per se, engaging in a collective effort, though that
action may enable others to advance their beliefs.228 For example,
suppose a downtown hardware store offers one of real billboards
for citizens to post and exchange recipes for Turkish food. The
business has no interest in promoting Turkish food, but is making
the space available to promote its goodwill. This business has not
created an association to advance the cause of Turkish food, even
though all the persons posting recipes have some kind of common
interest. The posters themselves do not qualify as an association,
unless they organize and choose an officer or other managing
agent. Similarly, Yahoo! has not created an association to advance
economic beliefs by setting up a bulletin board for posting
information about a particular publicly-traded company.
Match.com and its members do not comprise an association
advancing the association's interest in promoting happiness.
Match.com is making money, and the members are pursuing their
individual interests.
3. Who May Invoke the Privilege?
Given the existence of a recognizable association, the purpose
of which is to advance some political, religious, economic, or
cultural interest, a third issue is whether any particular individual
seeking to avail himself of the associational privilege is qualified
to do so. If the association is a "membership" organization,
members should be able to assert the privilege. 229 But there are
227 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 4 49, 460 (1958).
This also accords with the dictionary definition of "association" noted above.
See Association, n., supra note 221.228 See, e.g., Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
229 In Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Wallace, No. 75 Civ. 5388
(MJL), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22188, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1985), the
court stated an association's "sympathizers" would be protected by the
associational privilege. The term "sympathizers" is not, however, used in the
Supreme Court cases addressing the associational privilege. Further, it appears
that the court was reacting to the extreme breadth of the discovery requests-the
plaintiffs sought information about the Society's members, employees,
"devotees . . . adherents or agents"-in casting the net so widely. Id.
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many online associations that are not membership organizations.
Wikimedia Foundation, for example, is a 501(c)(3) organization
that sponsors, inter alia, Wikipedia.230 Its goal is to "collect and
develop the world's knowledge and to make it available to anyone
for free for any purpose."231 In furtherance of its goal, the
Foundation sponsors the Wikipedia website on which "anyone in
the world" can make entries.232 These facts would seem to qualify
it as an association advancing a cultural interest and, therefore,
entitled to claim the associational privilege. But could anyone who
made an entry claim the privilege?2 33 A reasonable limitation in
this regard may be found by returning to the fundamental purpose
of the privilege: to protect the right to engage in a "collective
effort." 234  Membership evidences some effort on the part of a
member: the payment of dues or fees, subscription to a newsletter,
or at a minimum consenting to having one's name included on a
list. Some similar showing of effort on behalf of or in the interests
of the organization should also be required of a non-member
seeking to invoke the privilege. In other words, posting one entry
on a website or blog sponsored by a qualified association would
not by itself suffice.
4. Heightened Relevance
Finally, the privilege can be overcome only if the party seeking
discovery meets the heightened relevance standard,235 which means
the information sought must be "crucial" to the case, 236 and the
requested discovery is the "least inclusive and intrusive" means of
230 Frequently Asked Questions, THE WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, http://wikime
diafoundation.org/wiki/Frequentlyasked questions (last visited Dec. 15, 2012).
231 id
232 id
233 For example, in Faconnable USA Corp. v. Does 1-10, 799 F. Supp. 2d
1202, 1203 (2011), the plaintiffs' defamation claim arose from an entry made by
the defendant in Wikipedia linking the plaintiff company to a terrorist
organization.
234 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
235 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1161. (9th Cir. 2009).
236 Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1268 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981)
vacated mem. sub. nom. Smith v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982).
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obtaining the information.2 37 When the anonymous speaker is the
defendant, the plaintiff has no recourse other than to obtain his
identity. 238 The heightened relevance standard would be met.
Arguably, the identity of a putative defendant could also be crucial
to the case if the allegations of the complaint supported the
assertion of liability against that person239 or the identity of a key
witness.
But the need for disclosure to the plaintiff-and to the judge
and witnesses who may need to know the identity of the
defendant-does not necessarily justify disclosure to the public
generally. The defendant's identity could be made subject to a
protective order. Thus, the privilege would remain meaningful,
albeit not standing as a total bar to the prosecution of the lawsuit.
Such a protective order would, in effect, allow the defendant to
proceed anonymously.
Few cases address the issue of allowing a defendant in a civil
lawsuit to litigate anonymously. 24 0 The instances of a John Doe
defendant wishing to remain anonymous have become frequent
only in the last few years, as anonymous communication via the
Internet has become universal.24 1 More commonly, the plaintiff is
237 Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
238 Cf Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255 (D. Conn. 2008)
(applying the new discovery privilege by holding that "the defendant's identity is
central to Doe II's pursuit of her claims against him").
239 But see Marfork Coal Co. v. Smith, 274 F.R.D. 193, 205 (S.D. W. Va.
2011). The plaintiff sued identified members of various environmental groups
and sought the identity of other members who may have been involved in the
protests from which the case arose, intending, presumptively, to then sue those
other members. Id. The court refused to require disclosure, because of the First
Amendment associational privilege and on relevancy grounds. Id.
240 The Article is here discussing private, civil litigation. In various
specialized proceedings the confidentiality of party information is established by
the rules applicable to those proceedings. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (2006)
(establishing rules for use of juvenile records in federal juvenile delinquency
proceedings).
241 This is obviously a different matter than deciding whether to allow a
plaintiff to name a John Doe defendant, pending discovery to determine the
identity of the actor. Regarding the latter, the rules were well-established in the
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the party desiring to remain anonymous, and the rules of decision
in such a case are fairly well-developed.
Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a
complaint shall include the names of all the parties, and "[t]he
normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real
names."2 42 The two reasons the parties are presumptively to be
named are the public's "right to open courts" 243 and the right of
private individuals to confront their accusers. 2" The presumption
can be overcome, and courts have discretion to allow a plaintiff to
proceed anonymously if disclosure of identity poses a reasonable
risk of retaliation or of suffering physical or mental injury harm
due to the disclosure of intimate or private information.245
In the few cases in which a defendant in federal district court
has requested to proceed anonymously, the courts have applied
these same rules for determining whether to allow a defendant to
proceed anonymously. In Doe I, and Doe II v. Individuals,2 46 the
court denied the defendants request to proceed anonymously,
finding that the "social stigma, embarrassment, and economic
harm" that could result from the lawsuit did not qualify as the
pre-Internet world. See, e.g., Munz v. Parr, 785 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir.
1985).
242 FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a); see, e.g., Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1316
(11th Cir. 2011); Does v. Kamehameha Schools, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.
2010).
243 Kamehameha Schools, 596 F.3d at 1042; see also James v. Jacobson, 6
F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993).
244 Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1315; Kamehameha Schools, 596 F.3d at 1042;
Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[The plaintiff] has denied [the
defendant] the shelter of anonymity-yet it is [the defendant], and not the
plaintiff, who faces disgrace if the complaint's allegations can be
substantiated ... . And if the complaint's allegations are false, then anonymity
provides a shield behind which defamatory charges may be launched without
shame or liability."); Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne
& Jaffe, 599 F. 2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979).
245 Kamehameha Schools, 596 F.3d at 1042; K.D. v. City of Norwalk, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42639, at *1 (D. Conn. June 14, 2006) (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
10(a)).
246 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008).
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"special harms" required to proceed anonymously. 247 For similar
reasons the court denied the defendants request to proceed
anonymously in Gorilla Girls, Inc. v. Kaz.248
But it is worth questioning whether the same presumption that
identity should be disclosed during the litigation should apply
when the party seeking to remain anonymous is a defendant and
the defendant's identity has been "unmasked," for several reasons.
First, the presumption is on shakier ground when one of the bases
for it disappears: All of the parties to the litigation know the
identity of the other. Second, in regard to the public's general
interest in "open courts," although it may be true that the general
knowledge that civil proceedings are open to the public provides
"therapeutic value to the community,"24 9 the degree of openness
necessary to provide that value may be different today than it was
years ago. The public has become accustomed to communicating
anonymously and reading the news posted by an anonymous
blogger. Arguably, so long as the claims made in a lawsuit, the
defenses asserted, and the outcome are a matter of public record,
the anonymity of the defendant would not, as a general rule,
adversely affect the public's interest in "open proceedings." 21o
On occasion, however, the identity of the defendant would be
of specific interest to members of the public. If the unmasked
247 Id. at 257.
248 224 F.R.D. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
249 Colleen E. Michuda, Defendant Doe's Quest for Anonymity: Is the Hurdle
Insurmountable?, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 144 (1997).
250 The disinclination to allow a party to proceed anonymously is often said to
be "constitutionally embedded." See K.D. v. City of Norwalk, No. 3:06CV 406
(WWE), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42639, at *1 (D. Conn. June 14, 2006).
However, the Supreme Court has not specifically spoken on the right to
prosecute or defend a civil trial anonymously. It has held that has the First
Amendment protects the public's right to attend criminal trials, and prohibits the
government from limiting the information to which the public should have
access, and noted the general presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980); Nixon v.
Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). Thus, though there may be
a general "presumption of openness" embedded in the Constitution, it can
certainly be overcome. See, e.g., James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.
1993).
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defendant were an elected official or a government agent-a police
officer, for example-the community may well be entitled to know
that that person has been accused of wrongdoing. If the unmasked
defendant were a publicly-traded corporation, the identity of that
company should be disclosed so that the shareholders are aware of
the alleged wrongdoing. There may be other instances in which a
defendant's identity should be disclosed in the public interest.
That interest does not, however, readily translate into "relevance"
to the case as that concept is defined by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.25'
It is proposed then, that the standard for overcoming the
associational privilege should be altered when a John Doe
defendant successfully invokes the privilege. In particular, the
privilege can be overcome to the extent that the plaintiff is able to
obtain the identity of the anonymous John Doe defendant, but the
defendant is ordinarily allowed to proceed anonymously. If,
however, the plaintiff demonstrates that the identity of the
defendant is of particular interest to the public because of the
defendant's special relationship to members of the public, the
defendant should not be allowed to proceed anonymously.25 2 Thus,
the new standard would require "heightened relevance" to unmask
the defendant to the plaintiff and "identified public interest" to
unmask the defendant to the public.
C. Contrasting Outcomes
In fashioning the anonymous speaker privilege, courts
responded to path-breaking technological and cultural innovations
by adapting existing principles of law to meet the needs of the
changed world. One of those needs, in the age of the Internet, is to
promote and sustain the "promise of the Internet" as a powerful
251 FED. R. EvID. 401. Evidence is relevant if it "has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable" or "is of consequence in determining the action." Id.
252 The plaintiff may have no interest in making the necessary showing, and to
this extent, the protection of the public's interest is dependent on a private party.
But, of course, this is true in many instances in the civil justice system. The
public's interest in the deterrent value of tort liability is dependent on the filing
of a lawsuit by an individual plaintiff, for example.
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tool for democratic participation in public debate, enabled, in part,
because the Internet so easily facilitates anonymous speech. 253 But
great caution must be exercised in the process of evolving the law
to meet new needs in order to prevent the destruction or diminution
of important old needs. In particular, to protect the right to redress
grievances in a court of law, and to obtain all relevant evidence,
any evidentiary privilege against discovery must be well-grounded
in the law and supported by considerations of economy and justice.
It is, therefore, well worth revisiting the anonymous speaker
privilege.
As discussed above, the only legitimate privilege against the
disclosure of the identity of a John Doe defendant arises from the
First Amendment's associational privilege, which can fairly readily
be adapted to the anonymous online world. Properly applied, this
privilege achieves the mutual objectives of protecting speech and
promoting justice.
The rules for invoking and overcoming the anonymous speaker
privilege, properly grounded on the associational privilege, provide
a stark contrast to the procedure adopted by the federal courts and
state courts in cases like Dendrite254 and Cahill.2 55 The initial
burden is on the defendant to show sufficient grounds for the
assertion of the privilege. Those grounds are a factual showing
that the speech was made in connection with an association and
disclosure of identity is reasonably likely to cause harm. So
applied, the anonymous speaker privilege will be in accord with
the general practice in regard to discovery privileges: The party
claiming the protection of the privilege "always bears the initial
burden of establishing the factual predicate for the privilege." 256
253 See Gleicher, supra note 12, at 323 ("From anonymous message boards
criticizing massive corporations, to citizens who scrutinize elected officials, to
websites that enable the anonymous release of government and corporate
documents, the Intemet has expanded the cape of anonymity to shield an army
of pamphleteers.").
254 Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
255 John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
256 In re Motor Fuel Temp. Sales Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 492 (10th Cir.
2011).
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Only if this burden is met does the plaintiff have to show a specific
need to know the identity of the defendant; no heightened
evidentiary requirements are imposed. Ordinarily this burden will
be met when the identity of the defendant is sought in discovery,
but identity will be disclosed only to the plaintiff and others
involved in the lawsuit with a true need to know. If the plaintiff
seeks public disclosure of the identity of the defendant, she will
have to demonstrate a specific and particular public interest in that
information.
Why does it matter? If, pursuant to the current regime,
disclosure of the identity of the defendant is allowed when
plaintiffs case is sufficiently strong, why revisit the privilege?
First, when dealing with issues of constitutional dimension it is
important to get it right. The textual origins and intellectual
rationale for First Amendment privileges should be solidly
grounded in law. Misunderstanding the source or reasoning that
undergirds those privileges can only lead to diffusion of those
rights and confusion of those principles. Further, when the
anonymous speaker privilege is properly grounded in the
associational privilege, different results in anonymous online
speech cases will obtain that are more evenhanded in balancing the
rights of those engaging in anonymous online speech and those
defamed, defrauded, or who have otherwise suffered real injury at
the hands of such speakers.
In Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.,257 the defendants, a publicly-
traded company and its officers and directors, were alleged to have
committed market fraud. The principal defense asserted by the
defendants was that the fluctuation in the market price of stock-
the basis of the plaintiff shareholders' alleged damages-was not
caused by the defendants.258 In support of this defense, defendants
alleged that derogatory remarks about the company and its
performance posted on a public bulletin board dedicated to
discussion about the defendant company had caused the price
257 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
258 Id. at 1090.
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fluctuations. 259  Defendants' theory was that the remarks were
posted in order to manipulate the stock price and benefit the
posters, in violation of securities laws. 260  Had the speakers
identified themselves in their postings, under the ordinary rules of
discovery the defendants would presumably have been allowed to
obtain discovery from those speakers, because the information
would have been relevant to the defense. But the postings were
anonymous. Applying the "old" anonymous speaker privilege, the
court granted the motion to quash defendant's subpoena seeking to
unmask the speakers.26 ' Applying the associational privilege, it is
highly likely that the result would have been otherwise. The public
bulletin board does not appear to qualify as an "association" that
has "members" qualified to invoke the privilege.
In Highfields Capital Management v. Doe,262 the court quashed
a subpoena seeking the identity of a poster of messages using the
screen name "highfieldscapital" on a public Internet message
board.263  The complaint alleged trademark infringement and
defamation.2 " Applying the "old" anonymous speaker privilege,
the court found that the plaintiff had not supported its allegations
with sufficient facts to show a prima facie case.265 Applying the
associational privilege, it is highly likely that the result would have
been otherwise. The public bulletin board does not appear to
qualify as an "association" that has "members" qualified to invoke
the privilege.
In Salehoo Grp., Ltd. v. ABC Co.,266 the John Doe defendant
owned and operated a website-www.salehoosucks.com-
dedicated to posting "unfavorable" information about the plaintiff
The plaintiff, alleging claims of trademark violation and
259 Id. at 1097.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 1098.
262 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
263 Id. at 972.
264 id.2651 d at 971.
266 722 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
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defamation, sought to unmask the defendant. 267 The court granted
Doe's motion to quash the subpoena to Doe's ISP on the grounds
that the plaintiff had not pled a prima facie case.268 Applying the
associational privilege, the motion would have been denied.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant company, by soliciting
comments about Salehoo, qualified as an association, it appears
unlikely that the disclosure of the individual owner and manager of
the association would subject him to the risk of public hostility or
retaliation. Even if the facts showed that the privilege could
successfully be invoked, the privilege would have been overcome
by the core relevance of the identity of the defendant to the
prosecution of the lawsuit.
In Cornelius v. DeLuca,269 the plaintiff sought to unmask an
anonymous online speaker in order to determine the relationship of
that speaker to the identified defendant. The speaker had made
allegedly defamatory remarks and, based on other facts in the case,
the plaintiff had reason to believe the speaker was an agent or
employee of the defendant.270 Applying the "old" anonymous
speaker privilege, the court denied the requested discovery, largely
on the grounds that the relevant information-the speaker's
relationship with the defendant-could be obtained by asking the
defendant.27 ' The court noted that the result was certainly a
departure from the ordinary rules of discovery:
[T]he Court understands that in the normal case where a witness's First
Amendment rights were not implicated, a party would not have to rely
solely on the word of a key representative of the opposing party. Here,
however, Plaintiffs have to come forward with something more to
justify the deterrent effect on free speech.272
Applying the associational privilege, the requested discovery
would have been granted. Assuming, arguendo, that
67 Id at 1213.
268 Id. at 1218.
269 No. 1:10-CV-027-BLW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27213, at *2 (D. Idaho
Mar. 15, 2011).
270 Id. at *13.
271 Id. at *13-14.
272 Id.
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bodybuilder.com, the website on which the posting was made,
qualified as an association, and that the poster was an employee or
otherwise a member of the association and could invoke the
privilege, it appears unlikely that the disclosure of identity would
subject the speaker to the risk of public hostility or retaliation.
Even if the facts showed that the privilege could successfully be
invoked, the privilege would arguably have been overcome by the
relevance of the identity of the speaker as a key witness or possible
defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
Current jurisprudence on the anonymous online speaker
privilege is rooted in the Talley-McIntyre line of cases. Because
those cases do not relate to any discovery privilege, however, they
give no guidance on the grounds for invoking or standards for
overcoming an anonymous speaker privilege. The courts have
therefore struggled to define these standards. As argued above,
this effort should be abandoned. The proper First Amendment
basis for an anonymous speaker privilege lies elsewhere, in the
"associational privilege" line of cases. While the associational
privilege has not yet been applied to protect anonymous online
speech, it can readily be adapted to the online world, as discussed
above.
The cases applying the associational privilege also set forth the
proper procedures for asserting and overcoming the anonymous
speaker privilege. The initial burden should be on the anonymous
John Doe defendant to show sufficient grounds for the assertion of
the privilege: that the speech was connected to the First
Amendment right to association, and disclosure of identity with
that association poses a real risk of harm. Only if this burden is
met should the plaintiff have to show a specific need to know the
identity of the defendant: No heightened evidentiary requirements
are imposed. These standards for invoking and overcoming the
anonymous speaker privilege, properly grounded on the
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associational privilege, better balance First Amendment rights and
the right of a party in civil litigation to "every man's evidence."2 73
273 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 189 (1978).
[VOL. 14: 249302
